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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,

:

Petitioner,
:

Case No. 20030155-CA

v.
UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW
BOARD,
Respondent.

:
:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Decision and Final Agency Action of the Career Service Review Board
(CSRB) was entered on January 28, 2003. R. 295-315. The State of Utah, Department of
Public Safety's Petition for a Writ of Review was filed on February 27, 2003. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-14(1997).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The CSRB erred as a matter of law when relied solely on the subjective
testimony of Trooper John Pace concerning his belief as to whether or not he was
involved in a vehicular pursuit, and disregarded the question of whether such a pursuit
actually occurred.

This issue was raised by the petitioner before the CSRB. R. 220-21, 269-73
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Since this issue raises a question of general law, this
Court reviews the "CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to that
agency's decision." Holland v. CSRB. 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions and statutes
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 25, 2000, Trooper Ross G. Pace was given a 20-day suspension. R. 34.
This discipline was supported by the findings of Public Safety's Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) that Pace had committed the following misconduct: 1) performed a vehicular
pursuit without following the agency's policies relating to such pursuits, 2) taking a lunch
break without notifying dispatch that he was taking a break, 3) failure to attend a
mandatory meeting, and 4) twice leaving his assigned duty area and working instead in
farm fields. R. 35-50. On June 5, 2000, Pace appealed the department's decision to the
CSRB. R. 1.
A hearing was held before CSRB Hearing Officer Katherine A. Fox on November
29-30, 2000. R. 201, 202. In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, the
CSRB's hearing officer upheld the department's decision, finding substantial evidence to
support each of the charges. R. 170-82. Pace's request for reconsideration was denied on
March 13, 2001. R. 195-98. Pace appealed to the CSRB on March 25, 2001. R. 199.
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On May 22, 2002, the CSRB entered is Decision and Order of Remand. R. 23557. The CSRB upheld the hearing officer's decision as to the charges concerning Pace's
failure to notify dispatch that he was taking a lunch break and his failure to attend a
mandatory meeting. The CSRB overturned the hearing officer's decisions as to the high
speed pursuit and the first working in a farm field charge, and remanded to the hearing
officer to reconsider the second charge concerning Pace's leaving his duty area to work in
a farm field. The hearing officer was also instructed on remand, based on the CSRB's
decision, to reconsider the proportionality of the 20-day suspension. R. 235-57.
On remand, the hearing officer found the 20-day suspension to be inappropriate in
light of the "corrected" findings of fact, and imposed instead a one-day suspension. R.
258-61. The CSRB entered its Decision and Final Agency Action, sustaining the one-day
suspension. R. 295-314. The department filed its Petition for Writ of Review on
February 27, 2003.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Utah's Department of Public Safety defines a vehicular pursuit as "[a]n active
attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects
who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics." R. 59.
The policy states that officers "may initiate a vehicular pursuit" when three criteria are
met.
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or
unlawful tactics.
3

The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the
officer.
The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance
the danger presented to the public.
R. 59.
On March 14, 1999, Ross Pace pursued a suspect who had been traveling at very
high speed. In his incident report, Pace explained:
On march 14, 1999,1 was eastbound 1-80 at milepost 157. At
approximately 1825 hours I noticed a red car westbound at a high rate of
speed. I initiated my radar and received a reading of 92 mph.
I activated my red lights and started through the median. As he was
passing me he looked right at me and then sped up. I got turned through the
median and started to chase him from milepost 157 to milepost 150. I could
keep track of him in front of me, but at speeds of between 80 and 100 mph I
was not gaining on him. I gained a little on him at approximately milepost
150 to 149 when he got blocked in by other traffic.
He then passed two semis in the right hand emergency lane. As he
got to Silver Creek Junction he started to take exit to eastbound SR-40. His
speed was still over 90 mph. He decided not to take the exit and swerved
back onto westbound 1-80. He went into the fast lane of traffic still at
speeds of 90 to 100 mph. He passed several more vehicles then swerved
across both lanes of traffic and went into the westbound rest area. He drove
halfway through the rest area and stopped.
I got him out of the car and arrested him for evading. While he was
in my car I could smell an odor of alcohol coming from the suspects breath.
When we got to the Summit county Jail, I went through a series of field
sobriety tests which he failed. He tested a .115 on the intoxilyzer. He was
arrested for evading and DUI.
R. 109-10.
While Pace notified the dispatcher that he needed supporting units, he did not at
any time inform dispatch that he was in a pursuit. R. 89. A Utah Highway Patrol Pursuit
Review Board found that Pace had initiated a vehicular pursuit, and that his action in not
4

advising dispatch of his pursuit showed "blatant disregard for his own safety, as well as
the safety of officers he was calling to assist him." R. 90. The Board found that Pace's
conduct was a "gross violation of policy." Id. Public Safety's ALJ also found that the
evidence showed that Pace had initiated a vehicular pursuit without following the
department's policies. R. 37-38.
The evidence before the CSRB's hearing officer also showed that a vehicular
pursuit had taken place. Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton testified that there must have been
a pursuit if the suspect was properly charged with felony evasion. R. 201 at 98. Sergeant
Jeff Peterson testified that, relying on the information contained in Pace's incident report
he concluded that a vehicular pursuit had taken place. R. 201 at 141-42, 146, 204-6.
Trooper Steven R. Bytheway, a witness called by Pace, had served for fourteen years as
an instructor of emergency vehicle operation. R. 202 at 281. After reading Pace's
incident report, Trooper Bytheway testified that the facts contained in the report showed
that a high-speed pursuit had occurred. R. 202 at 287-88, 290-1.
Officer Richard Henning, also called by Pace, did testify that the facts stated in the
incident report did not demonstrate a high-speed pursuit. R. 202 at 308-9. But Henning
admitted that this opinion was based on his own belief on what constituted a high-speed
pursuit and not on Public Safety's definition of a vehicular pursuit, admitting that he
didn't know the policies well enough. R. 202 at 309. Pace testified to the circumstances
and stated that it was his belief that he had not participated in a pursuit. R. 202 at 325-32.
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But Pace acknowledged that he had called it a pursuit in his incident report. R. 202 at
367. Pace further admitted that he had arrested the suspect for evading. R. 202 at 370-1.
Pace testified, and argued, that is was not a pursuit unless you were in close proximity to
the suspect. R. 202 at 383. Public Safety's definition of a vehicular pursuit does not
contain any requirement that the pursuing officer be in close proximity to the suspect. R.
59.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
One of the charges against Ross Pace was that he participated in a vehicular
pursuit without following Public Safety's policies concerning such pursuits. At every
level, from the department's ALJ to the CSRB's hearing officer, it was determined that
there was substantial evidence to support this charge. Instead of considering this
evidence, the CSRB ruled as conclusion of law that because Pace did not consider his
actions to constitute a high-speed pursuit1 he could not be charged with conducting such a
pursuit in violation of policy. This was based on the fact that, by policy, Pace was not
required to participate in a vehicular pursuit.
This legal conclusion is erroneous. Such a reading of the policy would mean not
that an officer had discretion in deciding whether a pursuit should be commenced, but
rather that he could not be disciplined for actions that constituted a pursuit that were
conducted in violation of the policy so long as he claimed that he had not been
1

Throughout the administrative proceedings, high-speed pursuit was used as
being interchangeable with vehicular pursuit, the term used by the regulation in question.
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performing a vehicular pursuit. Such a conclusion is contrary to law and good public
policy.
ARGUMENT
I. CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT ROSS PACE HAD THE
RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHETHER HIS ACTIONS
CONSTITUTED A VEHICULAR PURSUIT
Utah's Department of Public Safety pursuit policy defines a vehicular pursuit as
"[a]n active attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend
fleeing suspects who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful
tactics." R. 59. There is no discretion given to individual officers to create their own
definitions as to what will constitute a vehicular pursuit. What is left to the discretion of
the officers is the decision of whether to engage in a vehicular pursuit. The policy states
that officers "may initiate a vehicular pursuit" when three criteria are met.
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or
unlawful tactics.
The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the
officer.
The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance
the danger presented to the public.
R. 59.
When an officer initiates a vehicular pursuit, he is required to comply with the
pursuit policy, including the requirement that "the pursuing officer immediately notify
communications center personnel that a pursuit is underway." R. 60. Pace was not
charged with making a poor decision in initiating a vehicular pursuit. The charge against
7

Pace was that he initiated a vehicular pursuit, as that term is defined by the policy,
without complying with the policy's requirements.
The Pursuit Review Board, the department's ALJ and the CSRB's hearing officer
all reviewed the evidence with this question in mind. All found that the actions of Ross
Pace on March 14, 1999 constituted a vehicular pursuit. Based on this factual finding,
each found that Pace had violated Public Safety's pursuit policy and that this constituted
grounds for discipline.
The CSRB failed to address this factual issue because it reached an erroneous legal
conclusion. CSRB conflated two distinct portions of Public Safety's pursuit policy. It
read into the definition of what constituted a vehicular pursuit a discretion on the part of
the officer to determine what did or did not meet the definition.
CHAIRMAN ATKIN: It would be most helpful, at least for me - because as I recall, and I reread our opinion, and I'm more convinced of it
having reread that that what we were doing there, we weren't questioning
the factual basis for the hearing officer's decision. Rather, we were
interpreting what I view as legal issues in both of those instances. In the
first instance with regard to the high speed pursuit, our analysis, though it
may not have been a crystal clear as it might have been, and we may or may
not need to clarify that, but our analysis on the high speed pursuit wasn't a
question of whether somebody else could have thought it was a high speed
pursuit. We didn't see the hearing officer having determined factually that
there was a high speed pursuit. Rather, our analysis was that under the
statute or the regulation, that under the regulation, a high speed pursuit is a
term of art that's used to describe something that comes into play only after
the officer has exercised his discretion to determine that it is a high speed
pursuit.
It isn't a question of how fast he was going, it isn't a question of
what he observed, it's not a question of what was happening on the street
that somebody else might have determined it was a high speed pursuit. I
8

think we determined that it was a high speed pursuit only after the officer
had exercised that discretion to determine that it was a high speed pursuit.
And I think that the evidence in that regard is undisputed, that Officer Pace
testified that he hadn't determined that it was a high speed pursuit.
R. 316 at 4-5.
By reading into the definition of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit an absolute
discretion on the part of an officer in determining whether his or her actions meet the
definition, the CSRB has made this policy unenforceable. The Pursuit Review Board and
Public Safety's ALJ rejected Pace's claim that no pursuit took place because he said no
pursuit took place (regardless of the objective circumstances and facts to the contrary).
By adopting this interpretation of the pursuit policy, CSRB effectively precludes Public
Safety from regulating the manner in which its officers perform vehicular pursuits. All
officers have to do is claim that they did not believe a pursuit was in progress and no
review is permissible.
In Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993),
this Court used an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a challenge to the
Department of Human Resource Management's (DHRM) interpretation of its own
regulation. 'Thus, DHRM's application of that rule was reasonable and rational.
Accordingly, we conclude that DHRM did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Holland was not eligible for automatic reappointment under that rule." Id.
Public Safety has interpreted its pursuit policy as creating an enforceable definition
of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit. Whether or not a pursuit occurred was determined
9

by considering the circumstances of the particular incident. This is a reasonable and
rational application of Public Safety's pursuit policy.
This standard is one against which the actions of an officer can be considered.
Given the facts surrounding a particular incident, a determination can be made as to
whether an officer had engaged in a vehicular pursuit. No officer is required by the
policy to pursue a suspect against his or her best judgment. But where a pursuit has
occurred, the officer can be required to have followed the requirements of the policy.
The CSRB erred in holding that, by definition, a vehicular pursuit only takes place
when an officer says that it did. Under this definition, Public Safety's pursuit policy
becomes unenforceable as shown by this case. CSRB held that Pace was not involved in
a vehicular pursuit because Pace testified that he subjectively believed he was not
involved in a pursuit. Part of this testimony was based on Pace's addition of a proximity
requirement in his definition of a vehicular pursuit that does not appear in the actual
policy.
Under CSRB's interpretation of Public Safety's policy, the circumstances that
convinced all prior reviewers of the March 14, 1999 incident that it was a pursuit, as that
term is defined by policy, became irrelevant. The only significant fact under CSRB's
interpretation is the testimony of the officer as to what he or she believed at the time. The
result of CSRB's legal error is that Pace can avoid review of a pursuit done without
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compliance with the pursuit policy by simply claiming that he did not believe it to be a
pursuit.
The State of Utah, Department of Public Safety asks this Court to reject CSRB's
interpretation of Public Safety's definition of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit. This
matter should be remanded to the CSRB with instructions to uphold the hearing officer's
original determination that the department had substantiated the charge that Pace
conducted a vehicular pursuit without complying with the requirements for a pursuit. The
CSRB should be ordered on remand to reconsider whether, with this charge upheld, the
20-day suspension imposed by Public Safety meets the proportionality standard.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, the CSRB's final agency action should be
reversed and this matter should be remanded to the CSRB with instructions to uphold the
department's charge that Pace violated Public Safety's vehicular pursuit policy. CSRB
should be further instructed to reconsider the proportionality of the department's 20-day
suspension.
PETITIONER DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this matter.
The question raised by this petition not being such that oral argument or a published
opinion are necessary, though the petitioner desires to participate in oral argument if such
is held by the Court.
11

DATED this S

rW„day of November, 2003.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Petitioner
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JOEL A. FERRE
MARK E. BURNS
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee
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P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City Utah 84114-0857
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

TROOPER ROSS G. PACE,
Respondent,

DECISION AND
FINAL AGENCY ACTION

:

v.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,

:
:
:
:

Appellant.

Case Nos. 18 CSRB/H.0.262 (Step 5)
7 CSRB 64 (Step 6)

On Tuesday, November 26, 2002, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB)
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an
executive session. The following Board Members were present and heard oral argument at the
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Blake S. Atkin, Chairman, Joan M. Gallegos,
Dale L. Whittle, and Gloria E. Wheeler. At the hearing, Assistant Attorney General Laurie L. Noda
represented the Department of Public Safety (Department/DPS/Appellant) with Lin Miller, Human
Resource Director, present as the Department's Management Representative. Trooper Ross Pace
(Grievant/Respondent) was present and presented oral argument on his own behalf. Accompanying
Trooper Pace was his wife, Ramona Pace.
AUTHORITY
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408
(Supp. 1998) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures, which is a sub-part of the
Utah State Personnel Management Act at §§67-19 et seq. The CSRB's administrative rules are
published in the Utah Administrative Code at R137-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1998). This Board-level
or step 6 appeal hearing is the final administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and
Appeal Procedures for Trooper Pace's appeal from his 20-day suspension. Both the Board's
evidentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications"
pursuant to Rl 37-1-18(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions ofthe Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA) pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings.
(§§63-46be/^.)
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about August 30,1999, Respondent was given a '"Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline" that
was signed by Lt. Bardell Hamilton, Commander of Field Section Seven, Utah Highway Patrol
(UHP), where Respondent was employed. This ccNotice of Intent to Impose Discipline" was
superceded by a second "Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline" which was dated
November 29,1999, and signed by Richard A. Greenwood, Deputy Commissioner, Utah Department
of Public Safety. This second notice of intent to discipline recommended that Respondent's
employment with the Utah Highway Patrol be terminated.1 At the time these notices of intent were
issued, Respondent had been employed as a Trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol for more than
21 years.
The November Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline recommended that Respondent be
terminated based upon seven separate, unrelated charges all occurring in 1999. (Agency Ex. 4)
The first of these charges alleged that on March 14,1999, Respondent was involved in a high
speed chase that did not comply with DPS Policy 1-21 V relating to vehicle pursuits. In connection
with this allegation, the Department alleged that Respondent further violated UHP Policy 33-08 by
not completing an incident report prior to the end of his shift that day nor providing a copy of the
video tape of the alleged high speed pursuit. {Id. at R.)
The second charge alleged that on October 29, 1999, Respondent falsified his daily log by
documenting that he was "in service" patrolling while actually eating lunch at Pasillas Cafe. The
third charge alleged that Respondent falsified his weekly report for the week October 16 through
October 22,1999. The fourth charge alleged that on May 25, 1999, Respondent failed to attend a
mandatory section meeting in violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-6. The fifth charge
alleged that on May 30,1999, Respondent was in violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10
and DPS Policy and Procedures VI-1, 6-10, by leaving his assigned duty area and working in his
farm field. The sixth charge alleged that on August 19,1999, he was again working in a farm field
in direct violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 and a direct order allegedly given to
Respondent by Lt. Hamilton on August 12,1999, directing him to not work in his farm field while
on duty. The seventh and final charge involved allegations concerning a late incident report dated
November 4,1999.
The Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline dated August 30,1999, recommended that Respondent be
suspended without pay for 30 working days.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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After receiving the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline, Respondent requested
a hearing with the Utah Department of Public Safety's Administrative Law Judge (ALT)
J. Francis Valerga. This hearing took place on April 3 and April 5,2000. In a written opinion issued
in April 2000, Judge Valerga partially sustained the Department's first charge. Specifically,
Judge Valerga ruled that Respondent had engaged in a high speed chase and violated DPS Policy and
Procedure 1-21 by failing to notify dispatch of the pursuit. However, the other two allegations
specifically related to the high speed chase were dismissed. Specifically the allegations relating to
Respondent's failure to provide an incident report involving the alleged high speed chase or a video
tape were not sustained and dismissed. (Agency Ex. 2)
Judge Valerga sustained the second charge against Respondent - that he failed to properly
notify dispatch that he was taking a lunch break at Pasillas Cafe on October 29, 1999. He also
sustained the third charge against Respondent relating to Respondent's failure to attend a mandatory
section meeting on May 25,1999, in violation of UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-6. Judge Valerga
further sustained the fourth andfifthcharges set forth in the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to
Discipline alleging that Respondent violated UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 and a direct order by
working in his farmfieldon May 30,1999, and being in a farmfieldnext to a tractor on August 19,
1999. However, Judge Valerga did not sustain and overturned the third and seventh charges set forth
in the November 29, 1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline letter that involved the falsifying of
Respondent's weekly report and filing a late incident report.
Based upon his findings, Judge Valerga recommended to Craig L. Dearden, then
Commissioner of Public Safety, that Respondent's employment with the Department not be
terminated and that he be reinstated to full employment with a 30-day suspension. (Id. at R.)
Pursuant to Department policy, Respondent appealed the ALJ's Findings of Fact and
recommendation of a 30-day suspension to Commissioner Craig Dearden. After reviewing and
carefully considering the facts and information concerning this matter, Commissioner Craig Dearden
entered a Final Order that Respondent be suspended for 20 days and undergo a fitness for duty
psychological examination as well as a transfer to a new section. (Agency Ex. 1)
On about June 5, 2000, Respondent timely filed his appeal of Commissioner Dearden's
decision with the CSRB.

Pace v. Public Safety, 7CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
On November 29 and 30,2000, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB Hearing
Officer Katherine A. Fox (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Respondent represented himself pro se
and was assisted by his wife, Ramona Pace. The Department was represented by Assistant Attorney
General Laurie L. Noda, who was assisted by the Department's management representative,
Lt. Bardell Hamilton (Hamilton), Commander of UHP Section Seven.
At the hearing, the Hearing Officer received evidence concerning thefiveremaining charges
against Respondent. Specifically, there was testimony given and received concerning the Pasillas
Cafe incident occurring on October 29, 1999; Respondent's failure to attend a mandatory section
meeting on May 25,1999; the two farm field incidents occurring on May 30, and August 19,1999
respectively; and finally, there was testimony given and received concerning the alleged high speed
pursuit incident which occurred on March 14, 1999.
At the conclusion of this hearing, the Hearing Officer issued -her Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Initial Decision) dated December 20, 2000. In this Initial
Decision, the Hearing Officer specifically reviewed thefiveremaining charges against Respondent
and concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that "the Department's
imposed discipline is [was] appropriate in this case." (Initial Decision at p.5, Conclusion 11.)
On January 11,2001, Respondentfileda Request for Request for Reconsideration pursuant
Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-21(12). On March 13, 2001, the Hearing Officer denied
Respondent's Request for Reconsideration.
Respondent then appealed the Hearing Officer's decision to the Board.2 In this appeal before
the Board, Respondent essentially challenged the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision on two primary
grounds. First, Respondent argued that there was not substantial evidence to support the specific
charges against him and that the Hearing Officer erred by concluding that there was. Second,
Respondent argued that even ifthere was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Initial
Decision, the imposition of a 20-day suspension was disproportionate in relation to the charges
against him and in light ofthe discipline imposed on other individuals for similar acts of misconduct.

t

2

This appeal was timely filed with the CSRB on March 26,2001. As a point of clarification, it should be
pointed out that throughout this Final Decision, Mr. Pace is referred to as the Respondent However, as is evident
from the procedural history of this case, in the Initial Decision of the Hearing Officer, the Deparment's allegations
and proposed discipline were upheld and appealed by Mr. Pace. Thus, Mr. Pace was the appellant during the prior
Step 6 proceedings before the Board.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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On April 24,2002, the Board completed its Step 6 review of Respondent's original appeal
with a hearing involving all the parties and by meeting in an executive session. On May 22,2002,
the Board issued its Decision and Order of Remand in this case. This Decision and Order of Remand
significantly modified and amended the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision.
In its Order of Remand, the Board specifically overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's
Initial Decision relating to two of the allegations against Respondent. Specifically, with respect to
the High Speed Pursuit Incident,3 the Board overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's Initial
Decision because the Board did not believe that the Department's policies, rules or procedures were
correctly applied to the facts associated with this allegation.4
The Board also overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect
to the May 30, 1999 Farm Field Incident. Again, with respect to this charge, the Board found
reversible error in the Hearing Officer's application of the Department's policies or rules to the facts
surrounding this incident. Because the Board found that the applicable policies and rules were not
correctly applied with respect to the May 30,1999, Farm Field Incident, the Hearing Officer's Initial
Decision with respect to this allegation was overturned and vacated.5
In addition to overturning the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect to the High
Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30, 1999, Farm Field Incident, the Board used its discretion
under Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a) to correct the factual findings relied upon by the
Hearing Officer to sustain the Department's allegation relating to the August 19,1999 Farm Field
Tractor Incident. The Board then remanded this specific allegation to the Hearing Officer with the
corrected facts and instructions for the Hearing Officer to revisit her findings with respect to this
allegation and to render a decision properly weighing and considering the facts as corrected by the
Board.

As set forth in the Board's May 22,2002 Decision and Order of Remand, in order to enhance clarity, the
Board has determined to use the same title or label the Hearing Officer used in addressing the allegations against
Respondent. For example, in the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision, the Hearing Officer addresses the first charge
against Respondent as the High Speed Pursuit Incident. The Board in this Final Decision will use the same
identifying titles or labels as it relates to the allegations against Respondent.
4

This decision was rendered pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(b) which allows the
Board to determine whether the CSRB Hearing Officer correctly applied the relevant policies or rules to the facts of
the case. This review is done on a correctness standard with the Board giving no deference to the hearing officer's
decision.
This decision was rendered pursuant to the same administrative rule as cited in the previous footnote.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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Finally, the Board upheld the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision sustaining the Department's
allegations with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and Respondent's Failure to Attend a
Mandatory Section Meeting Incident. However, because the Board's Decision and Order of Remand
significantly modified and amended the Hearing Officers Initial Decision, the Board ordered the
case remanded to the Hearing Officer to make a decision as to the appropriate and proportionate
discipline that should be imposed upon Respondent in light of the Board's modification to the
Hearing Officer's Initial Decision.6
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. REMANDED EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND DECISION ON REMAND

The Board remanded this case to the Hearing Officer on two evidentiary issues.7 First, the
Board remanded the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect to the August 19, 1999 Farm
Field Tractor Incident to make findings and a decision that considered the facts as corrected by the
Board. By this Order, the Board was not overturning or vacating the Hearing Officer's Initial
Decision with respect to the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. Rather, the Board was
simply requiring that the Hearing Officer revisit this allegation and make her decision using the facts
as corrected by the Board.8
Recognizing that the Hearing Officer was in the best position to weigh the evidence, even
with the corrected facts, and to judge the veracity of the various witnesses' statements, the Board
remanded this allegation to the Hearing Officer for further review. The final decision as to whether
there was substantial evidence to support this allegation remained with the Hearing Officer. The

6

The Board felt that this remand was appropriate because the 20-day suspension imposed upon Respondent
was based upon the Hearing Officer's sustaining of all five of the Department's allegations against him. Because the
Board had overturned and vacated two of the most severe allegations against Respondent, the Board felt a review by
the Hearing Officer of the discipline imposed by the Department was required. This was especially true in light of
the fact that evidence during the Step 5 hearing established that the Trooper with whom Respondent had lunch at
Pasillas Cafe only received a one-day suspension for that incident. Also, with respect to Respondent's failure to
attend the mandatory section meeting, the Board noted that another trooper who missed that same section meeting
was not disciplined and that in more than twenty-two years of service with the Department, Respondent had never
missed a previous mandatory section meeting.
7

This remand was ordered pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(7).

8

In her "Decision on Remand," the Hearing Officer states the following: "The hearing officer fully
acknowledges that she failed to record the fact that Grievant did indeed deny that he had been given a verbal order
and she sincerely regrets this mistake
By way of explanation rather than excuse, what was clear in the transcript
was not so clear during this hearing." (Decision on Remand, P.2, Footnote 1)
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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only requirement placed upon her by the Board was that she weigh and consider the corrected facts
in making her decision.
The second evidentiary issue to be addressed by the Hearing Officer on remand concerned
the proportionality or severity of the discipline imposed upon Respondent in light of the Board's
Decision and Order of Remand. This issue became necessary because the Board overturned and
vacated two of the five allegations sustained by the Hearing Officer and remanded a third allegation
to the Hearing Officer for further deliberation. These facts necessitated that the Hearing Officer
review the record as a whole and make a determination as to whether a 20-day suspension was
proportionate in light of the Board's Decision and Order of Remand.
On June 7,2002, the Hearing Officer entered her Decision on Remand. Consistent with the
Board's Decision and Order of Remand, the Hearing Officer's remanded decision considered only
the allegations not previously dismissed or vacated by the Board. Moreover, in her remanded
decision, the Hearing Officer appropriately incorporated and considered the corrected facts given to
her by the Board in analyzing the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident.
In the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand, she significantly amended and modified the
discipline imposed upon Respondent. With respect to the two allegations sustained by the Board,
specifically the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting
Incident, the Hearing Officer imposed a one-day suspension. The Hearing Officer based this one-day
suspension on the fact that another trooper only received a one-day suspension for identical
infractions.9 In reducing the discipline to a one-day suspension without pay, the Hearing Officer also
considered the fact that in nearly twenty-two years of service with the Department, Respondent had
never missed a previous mandatory section meeting.
With respect to the August 19, 1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident, the Hearing Officer
modified her Initial Decision with respect to this allegation and reduced the discipline imposed upon
Respondent to a written reprimand. After reviewing the evidentiary record, the Hearing Officer
determined that there was considerable uncertainty as to whether Respondent disobeyed a direct
order that ultimately gaveriseto the allegation supporting the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor

The evidence in the record establishes that Trooper Brown received a one-day suspension for engaging in
the same conduct that Respondent was alleged to have participated in with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident.
Apparently aggravating Trooper Brown's discipline in connection with this incident was the fact that he also made
"inappropriate comments to another Agency on the radio." Trooper Brown was not disciplined for failure to attend
the same mandatory section meeting.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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Incident. The Hearing Officer concluded that there was evidence to support that a "less formal"
order was given to Respondent directing him to stay out of his farm field and that the "offhand
manner" in which the order was issued caused Respondent to not remember receiving such an order.
Based upon these facts, the Hearing Officer reduced the discipline imposed upon Respondent with
respect to this allegation to a written reprimand.10
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In the Department's appeal before the Board, the Department asserts that the imposition of
a one-day suspension and written reprimand are not appropriate given the policy violations sustained
by the Board.11 Specifically, the Department states at page 7 of their brief12 that "It is the Agency's
[Department's] position that the totality of violations must be viewed when making any assessment
as to disciplinary action in this case and that the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision upholding the
twenty-day suspension was appropriate and should be sustained by the Board when viewed in the
context in which it was given, i.e., the entire suspension was imposed on the basis of five cumulative
incidents." (Agency's Brief to the Board at p.7)
Concerning the August 19, 1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident, the Department argues that
even considering the facts as corrected by the Board in its Decision and Order of Remand, the
Hearing Officer erred by imposing only a written reprimand for this violation. The Department
argues that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Department's decision with
respect to this allegation and that because Respondent's actions were "serious and there was no
evidence that a written reprimand was appropriate," the Hearing Officer's decision to impose a
written reprimand was in error. (Id)
In addition to these issues, the Department also challenges the Board's original Decision and
Order of Remand that overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision concerning the
High Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30, Farm Field Incident. With respect to the High Speed
Pursuit Incident, the Department argues that the Board erred in its Decision and Order of Remand
by placing "undue emphasis" on the discretionary aspect ofthe policy governing high speed pursuits.

10

Hearing Officer Decision on Remand at Page 3 and 4.

11

As stated previously, only the Pasillas Caf<§ Incident and the incident involving Respondent's failure to
attend a mandatory section meeting were folly sustained by the Board.
12

The Department entitles their brief "Agency's Brief To The Board In Opposition To The Board's
Decision And Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand."
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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The Department argues that the primary focus should have been on the actions taken by Respondent,
not his intent. (Id, at 3)
With respect to the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident, the Department argues that the Board
erred by substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer. (Id, at 5) The
Department bases this argument on the fact that the Hearing Officer's factual findings were not
"clearly erroneous." (Id.)13
In essence, the Department challenges the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand on the
following grounds. First, the Department asserts that the imposition of a twenty-day suspension was
appropriate based upon the number of incidents alleged against Respondent and the nature of the
policy violations he committed. Second, the Department asserts that the factual evidence was
sufficient to sustain the allegations supporting the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. The
Department asserts that because substantial evidence exists to support this allegation, the Hearing
Officer erred by reducing the discipline to a written reprimand. Finally, the Department challenges
the Board's original Decision and Order of Remand with respect to the High Speed Pursuit Incident
and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. The Department argues that substantial evidence exists
to support these allegations and that the Board erred in overturning and vacating these allegations.
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the Department's appeal under Utah Administrative Code R137-l-22(4)(a)
through (c), (Supp. 2000), which reads as follows:
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial
evidence standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct
the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings.

It should also be noted at this time that the Department's brief on appeal to the Board concerning the
Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand addresses issues that are not necessarily proper for appeal to the Board.
Specifically, the Board previously overturned and vacated the Department's allegations with respect to the High
Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. In her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer
appropriately does not revisit these two allegations. On remand, she made no ruling or decision with respect to these
two allegations and therefore, there if nothing for the Department to appeal to the Board relating to these two
allegations at this time. The Board believes without deciding that these issues can be appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals once a Final Decision has been issued by the Board.
It appears that the Department's efforts to raise these issues at this point before the Board is an effort to
have the Board reconsider their Decision and Order of Remand. Reconsiderations are authorized pursuant to Utah
Administrative Code, R137-l-21(12). For these reasons, the Board will address the Department's concerns with
respect to the High Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident in this Decision and Final
Agency Action.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings
based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules,
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions.

Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's
factual findings are reasonable and rationally based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies,
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the
disciplinary sanction imposed by the Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon our
determination of the ultimate facts together with the correct application of relevant State policies,
rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer.
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
1. REVIEW OF THE HEARING OFFICER'S IMPOSITION
OF A ONE-DAY SUSPENSION AND WRITTEN REPRIMAND

On appeal, the Board must now determine whether the totality of the sanctions imposed by
the Hearing Officer in her Decision on Remand are reasonable and rational based upon the facts of
this case. {Utah Administrative Code R137-l-22(4)(c))14 In her Decision on Remand, the Hearing
Officer imposed a one-day suspension against Respondent for the Pasillas Cafe Incident and for
Respondent's Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident. (Decision on Remand at p. 4)
The Hearing Officer reached this decision in light of the Board's Decision and Order on Remand
which overturned and vacated two of the five allegations against Respondent. (Id.)

With respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Respondent's Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section
Meeting Incident, the Board has already ruled that there was substantial evidence as required by Utah Administrative
Code, Rl37-1-22(a) to support the Hearing Officer's factual findings with respect to these two allegations. Again,
these two allegations were remanded to the Hearing Officer only to determine whether the discipline imposed upon
Respondent was reasonable and rational in light of the Board's Decision and Order on Remand.
Pacev. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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In reaching her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer appropriately considered that
another trooper who also failed to attend the mandatory section meeting and to check out with
dispatch when going on break with Respondent at Pasillas Cafe received only a one-day suspension
for those policy violations. (Id) Finally, in her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer considered
the fact that in nearly twenty-two years of service with the Department, Respondent had never
missed a prior mandatory section meeting. (Id)
After carefully reviewing the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand and considering the
evidentiary record as a whole, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's imposition of a one-day
suspension in connection with the Pasillas Cafe Incident and Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section
Meeting Incident. The evidentiary record establishes that Respondent did not check out with
dispatch when going on a break at Pasillas Cafe. (T.I., 356-358) This incident occurred after the
Department issued a memorandum stating that all officers in Respondent's section were required to
check out with dispatch prior to going on break. (T.I. 152-155; Agency Ex.9)15 The evidentiary
record also clearly establishes that Respondent failed to attend a mandatory section meeting on
May 25,1999, after being given a direct order to do so.
Finally, with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and Respondent's Failure to Attend a
Mandatory Section Meeting Incident, the record also establishes that another trooper who was
involved in the same conduct as Respondent received only a one-day suspension for his actions.
(T.II, 269,271 & 379) Specifically, the evidentiary record establishes that Trooper Paul Brown, who
accompanied Respondent to Pasillas Cafe and also failed to check out with dispatch before going
on this break received a one-day suspension for this policy violation. (T. II, 271, 379).16 Trooper
Brown also failed to attend the same mandatory section meeting as Respondent, but was not
disciplined for doing so. (T.II, 269, 271) Finally, the record establishes that in nearly twenty-two
years of service with the Department, Trooper Pace had never missed a prior mandatory section
meeting. (T.ffl 361)

The Pasillas Cafg Incident occurred on October 29,1999. The memorandum instructing troopers to check
out with dispatch prior to going on break was dated July 15,1999.
The evidentiary record establishes that Trooper Brown received a one-day suspension. However, it
appears that this one-day suspension was given in connection with the Pasilla's CafS Incident and for "inappropriate
comments made to another agency on the radio." (Id) (Emphasis added)
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-21(3)(b) allows the hearing officer to determine
whether the agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanction imposed, is excessive,
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In her Decision on Remand, the
Hearing Officer exercised her authority under this rule and reduced the disciplinary sanction imposed
upon Respondent for these allegations to a one-day suspension.
Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(c), the Board finds the Hearing
Officer's decision to impose a one-day suspension for the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure to
Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate
factual findings in this case. Therefore, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's Decision on
Remand to impose a one-day suspension with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure
to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident.
2.

AUGUST 19,1999 FARM FIELD TRACTOR INCIDENT

In the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision, she sustained this allegation primarily on the
mistaken finding of fact that Respondent never denied receiving a verbal directive from his
lieutenant to stay out of his farm field.17 In her Initial Decision, the Hearing Officer states:
[Appellant] did not deny that he had been given a verbal directive by Lt. Hamilton
on August 12, to stay out of his fields. His defense appears to be that there is no
written record of the meeting and Lt. Hamilton could not remember all the details
relating to this meeting when the order was issued, i.e., whether it was on break or
in the office. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision at p. 8)

Later on that same page, the Hearing Officer again states:
Neither does he dispute that prior to the incident, he was given a verbal order by
Lt. Hamilton. (Id. at R.)

In its Order of Remand, the Board noted that the Hearing Officer's factual conclusions with
respect to this allegation were not supported by the record transcript and did not accurately reflect
Respondent's testimony at the evidentiary hearing on this issue. The Board noted that in the
evidentiary hearing on this matter, Respondent not only denied that such an order was given him by
his lieutenant,18 but in an apparent attempt to show the Hearing Officer that this verbal order never

17

The position of the Department at the evidentiary hearing was that this verbal directive was given to
Respondent by his lieutenant on August 12,1999. (T.II, 389-391)
18

Page 351 provides as follows: On page 351 of the hearing transcript, Appellant testified as follows:
MR. PACE: Nowhere on this log does it show that I met with Lieutenant
Hamilton. I don't ever remember a meeting with Lieutenant Hamilton as far as a
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occurred, Respondent spent considerable time at the evidentiary hearing attempting to show that
Lt. Hamilton and Respondent were never together on August 12,1999. (T.I, 128; II, 350)
In the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand, she appropriately considered and reviewed the
facts as set forth in the Board's Decision and Order of Remand. After reviewing this evidentiary
record, the Hearing Officer determined that there was substantial uncertainty as to whether
Respondent in fact disobeyed a direct order to stay of his farm fields. (Decision on Remand at p.3)
In her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer concluded that any such directive given to
Respondent was given in a less "formal" manner than would normally be the case when a trooper
receives a direct orderfromhis supervisor. (Id.) The Hearing Officer concluded that because of the
informal or "off-hand" manner in which the directive was given, said directive never registered with
Respondent. (Id.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Hearing Officer focused on a number of factors including the
fact that Lt. Hamilton failed to "log" any such directive or order in his log book and on the fact that
he could not recall where or at what time on August 12, the alleged directive was given to
Respondent. (Id) The Hearing Officer also noted that at the time such directive was given to
Respondent, Lt. Hamilton was winding up his work so that he could leave on vacation. (Id) Finally,
the Hearing Officer noted in her Decision on Remand that at the time such directive was given to
Respondent, the relationship between Lt. Hamilton and Respondent had deteriorated to the point
where communication between the two men had become hostile and largely ineffective. (Id)
The cumulative effect of all of these factors led the Hearing Officer to conclude in her
Decision on Remand that any such directive given to Respondent by Lt. Hamilton was given in an
informal or "off-hand" manner so that any such order never registered with Respondent. Based upon
these facts, the Hearing Officer imposed a written reprimand against Respondent for his conduct in
relation to the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. (Id. at 4)

verbal direct order to not be in any field.
HEARING OFFICER: Is your testimony that nowhere on 8/12/99 do you
remember a meeting?
MR. PACE: That's correct, I don't remember any meeting and I don't
remember getting a verbal direct orderfrom—
HEARING OFFICER: On this day?
MR. PACE: —Hamilton. On any day.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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As stated previously, the Board's obligation on review is to first make the determination on
whether the factual findings of the Hearing Officer with respect this allegation are reasonable and
rational according to the substantial evidence standard. (R137-l-22(4)(a))
On remand from the Board, the Hearing Officer clearly reviewed and considered the
testimonyfromboth Respondent and Lt. Hamilton as to whether Respondent had received an order
from Lt. Hamilton to stay out of his farm fields. In making her factual determination, the Hearing
Officer reviewed the testimony set forth in the evidentiary record and considered the facts in light
of the Board's remand with respect to this allegation. After thoroughly reviewing the testimony of
the witnesses, the Hearing Officer concluded that, though Respondent had been directed to stay out
of his farm field, this directive was given in such an informal or "off-hand" manner as to not fully
register with Respondent.
Applying the Board's previously cited standard ofreview, we hold that the Hearing Officer's
findings in her Decision on Remand with respect to this allegation are reasonable and rational in
view ofthe record as a whole. Moreover, with respect to findings of fact, this Board has consistently
held that the factfinder is entitled to presumption of correctness.

Jones v. Utah Department of

Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38 (1992) See, generally Parks and Recreation v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at
p.7-8 (1986); Utah Department of Transportation vs. Rasmussen, 2 PRB 19 at p.10-11(1986).
After finding that the Hearing Officer's factual findings with respect to this allegation are
supported by substantial evidence, the Board must now determine whether the totality of sanction
imposed by the Hearing Officer in her Decision of Remand are reasonable and rational based on the
facts of this case. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(c)) In her Decision on Remand, the
Hearing Officer ordered that Respondent be given a written reprimand for his failure to obey
Lt Hamilton's informal directive that Respondent stay out of his farm field.
After carefully considering the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand and the evidentiary
record as a whole, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's imposition of a written reprimand in
connection with this incident. The evidentiary record clearly establishes that there was a strong
disagreement between the parties as to whether or not Respondent actually received a directive on
August 12,1999,fromLt. Hamilton to stay out of his farm field. (T.I, 31,79,128,148; T.II, 351)
The record also establishes that Lt. Hamilton was clearly uncertain as to the time or place that he
gave this directive to Respondent. (T.I, 128-129,390, & 397) Finally, the record also establishes that

Pacev. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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Lt. Hamilton did not log any such directive in his log book and that the directive was given
immediately proceeding a vacation that he was planning on taking. (Id.)
Based upon the facts of this case, it appears that the Hearing Officer's imposition of a written
reprimand is both reasonable and rational. The facts establish genuine uncertainty as to the formal
nature of the direct order given to Respondent. The Board also notes that the Department imposed
no discipline on Trooper Brown for his violation of a verbal order to attend a mandatory section
meeting. The totality of the circumstances surrounding this incident convince the Board that the
imposition of a written reprimand in connection with the August 19, 1999 Farm Field Tractor
Incident is appropriate and the Board hereby sustains the Hearing Officer's decision regarding this
incident.
3- DEPARTMENT'S OPPOSITION TO THE BOARD'S DECISION TO OVERTURN AND VACATE THE
HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE HIGH SPEED PURSUIT INCIDENT AND THE
MAY

30,1999 FARM FIELD INCIDENT
In its brief on appeal before the Board, the Department argues that the Board erred in

overturning and vacating the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect to the High Speed
Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. With respect to the High Speed Pursuit
Incident, the Department contends that the Board placed "undue emphasis" on the discretionary
nature of the pursuit policy Respondent was alleged to have violated. The Department argues that
the central focus should be on the actions taken by Respondent, not his intent.
With respect to the May 30, 1999 Farm Field Incident, the Department argues that the
Department erred by substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer's.
The Department bases this argument on the fact that the Hearing Officer's factual findings with
respect to this incident were not "clearly erroneous."
a. High Speed Pursuit Incident
Respondent was charged with violating DPS Policy 1-21, Vehicle Pursuits. This policy
provides in pertinent part as follows:
V. PROCEDURES
1. Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle with operable
emergency vehicle equipment and radio may initiate a vehicular pursuit
when the following criteria are met:
a.
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid
apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics.
b.
The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the
direction of the officer.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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c.

B.

The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue
would further enhance the danger presented to the
public.
***
Pursuit Officer Responsibilities:
1.
The pursuing officer shall activate headlights and all
emergency equipment upon initiating pursuit.
2.
The pursuing officer shall immediately notify communications
center personnel that a pursuit is underway. Use ofplain English
transmissions is encouraged, rather than using the ten-code. The
officer shall provide communications center personnel with the
following information:
a.
Unit identification;
b.
Location, speed, and direction of travel of the fleeing
vehicle;
c.
Description and license plate number, if known of the
pursued vehicle;
d.
Number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including
descriptions, where possible; and
e.
Reason for initiating the pursuit

(Department Ex.5) (Emphasis added)
This policy clearly provides that a trooper or other law enforcement officer may initiate a
vehicular pursuit only when one of the following criteria is met: The suspect exhibits the intention
to avoid apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics; the suspect operating the vehicle refuses
to stop at the direction of the officer; or, the suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would
further enhance the danger presented to the public.
Once the officer makes a subjective determination with respect to these issues, the officer
must inform a "communications center" of the officer's unit identification; the location, speed, and
direction of travel of the fleeing vehicle; a description and license plate number if known; the
number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle including descriptions where possible; andfinally,the
reasons for initiating the pursuit.
At the evidentiary hearing concerning this allegation, numerous witnesses including
Col. Richard Greenwood, then Deputy Commission with the Department of Public Safety and
Superintendent of the Utah Highway Patrol, testified that it is up to the trooper involved in a vehicle
chase to determine whether the required elements are present to initiate a high speed pursuit.
(T.I, 48) Consistent with Col. Greenwood's testimony, Trooper Steven Bytheway, Nolan Brown and
Richard Henning all testified that it is the officer involved in the chase that makes the discretionary
decision of whether to initiate a "pursuit" under Department policy. (T.n, 262-263; 282; 303)
In the instant case, the most credible evidence concerning Respondent's intent with respect
to this incident is his own testimony at the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Respondent testified
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action

Page 16

0310

that throughout the incident giving rise to this allegation, the vehicle he was chasing was
approximately three-quarters to a mile ahead of him. (T.II, 331-334) He also testified that
throughout much of this incident he had no visual contact with the car he was chasing because they
were traveling on a winding mountain road. (T.II, 228-229) It was not until the chase's final half
mile or "the last minute" that Respondent realized the driver he was chasing was actively trying to
avoid apprehension. (T.II, 331-334)
At that point, just when Respondent believed the chase was turning into a "10-80" pursuit
according to DPS policy, the driver pulled into a rest area and came to a stop. (Id.) Because of these
facts, Respondent testified that during most of this chase, he was not certain whether the suspect
knew he was being pursued by Respondent and thus trying to avoid apprehension; or, if the suspect
was just simply continuing to travel at a very high rate of speed, unaware that Respondent was
chasing him. (Id.)
The Department argues that the "actions taken" by Respondent conclusively establish that
he was involved in a high speed pursuit under DPS Policy 1-21 V and that because he did not inform
a "communications center" of his unit identification; location, speed or direction of travel;
description of the license plate number of the vehicle he was pursuing; or, the reason for initiating
pursuit, he was in violation of this policy. The Board is not persuaded by this argument.
The Respondent's actions with respect to this incident simply do not, in and of themselves,
establish that he was involved in a high speed pursuit pursuant to DPS Policy 1-21 V. This is
especially true when one closely examines the facts of this case. The record establishes that the
pursuit occurred on a curvy, mountain road. (T.II, 328-329) The individual that Respondent was
chasing was approximately three-quarters to one mile ahead of him during most of the pursuit. (Id.
at 331-334) Because of these conditions, Respondent testified that there were long periods of time
where he lost complete visual contact with the car he was chasing. (Id.) Finally, Respondent
testified that during most of this chase, he, himself, was not certain whether the suspect knew he was
being pursued by Respondent and thus trying to avoid apprehension, or if the suspect was simply
continuing to travel at a very high rate of speed, unaware of Respondent's pursuit. (Id.)
Upon review of its prior Decision and Order of Remand, the Boardfindsno legal justification
to reverse its prior decision with respect to this allegation. In reaching its initial Decision and Order
of Remand, the Board thoroughly and completely examined and reviewed all of the evidence relied
on by the Hearing Officer in reaching her Initial Decision in which she sustained this allegation. The
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action
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Board reviewed Respondent's Incident Report filed with respect to this incident and also read the
administrative law judge's level four decision in this matter. The Department's Pursuit Review
Board's Findings were reviewed by the Board and extensively discussed in their Decision and Order
of Remand as was the testimony from the other witnesses who testified that after reviewing the
record, they believed Respondent was involved in a high speed chase.
All of these factors were weighed and considered by the Board in reaching its initial Decision
and Order of Remand. The policy relied upon by the Department clearly provides that it is not until
an officer involved in chase makes a subjective determination that the individual they are chasing
is attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to stop that they may initiate a pursuit. (Emphasis
added)
The evidence in this case establishes that Respondent never made that subjective
determination. Close review of the facts surrounding this incident give real credibility to
Respondent's testimony that he did not believe he was involved in a high speed pursuit as outlined
in DPS Policy 1-21V. Without that subjective determination being made, substantial evidence does
not support a finding that a high speed pursuit occurred.
b. May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident
In their brief on appeal, the Department argues that the Board erred with respect to this
allegation for substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer's. The
Department argues the Board cannot do this unless the Hearing Officer's factualfindingsare clearly
erroneous. (Department Brief at p.5)
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the Board did not substitute its "assessment of the
evidence" for that of the Hearing Officer. On page 16 ofthe Board's Decision and Order of Remand,
the Board stated as follows:
"After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, this Board finds that
the Hearing Officer's factual findings with respect to this incident are reasonable
and rational and can be supported by substantial evidence."

The Board did, however,, find reversible error in the Hearing Officer's application of the
Department's policies or rules to the facts surrounding this incident. Because the Board found that
the applicable policies and rules were not correctly applied in connection with the May 30, 1999
Farm Field Incident, the Board overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's decision with respect
to this incident.
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In its Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Department charged Respondent with violating UHP
Regulation 3-1-10 and DPS Policy and Procedure VI-1,6-10. These policies essentially require that
officers devote their on duty time to the completion of their tasks.
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, Col. Richard Greenwood testified that it would not
be a violation of these policies for a trooper to be in his farm field if he was on break. (T.I, 53)
Specifically, on cross-examination, Col. Greenwood was asked "If I can show that I am on break
during the time they supposedly saw me in myfield,am I allowed to be out in my field on break?
A. I-If you're on break, yeah." {Id. at R.) Moreover, the record established that at the time
Respondent was seen in his farm field on May 30,1999, he was, in fact, on break. (Gvt. Ex.9)19
As stated previously, in reaching its decision to overturn and vacate the Hearing Officer's
decision with respect to this incident, the Board ruled that the Hearing Officer failed to correctly
apply relevant policies, rules and statutes. The Board did not substitute its assessment of the
evidence for that of the Hearing Officer. It simply reviewed and considered all the evidence in the
record according to the correctness standard as required by Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-22.
Finally, the Board notes that with respect to the May 30, 1999 Farm Field Incident, the
Department's Notice of Intent to Discipline dated November 29,1999, does not specifically charge
Respondent with violating a direct order. However, the specific language set forth in the allegation
surrounding this incident states that "On August 12,1999, Lt. Hamilton specifically told you that
under no circumstances were you to work in your farm field while on duty." (Agency Ex.4)
At the time the Board rendered its Decision and Order of Remand, it was aware that violating
a direct order was not one of the specific charges used against Respondent with respect to the
May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. However, because the Department chose to use such language
in its Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Board felt compelled to address this issue.20
In its Decision and Order of Remand the Board felt that applicable policies and rules were
not correctly applied by the Hearing Officer with respect to this incident, and therefore, overturned

In its brief, the Department appears to argue that by considering Gvt. Ex.9, it is substituting "its
assessment of the evidence" for that of the Hearing Officer. This is simply not the case. The Hearing Officer's
Initial Decision focuses solely on the fact of whether Respondent was in fact in his farm field on May 30,1999.
Once the Hearing Officer reached her conclusion that he was in fact in his farm field on that day, she concluded that
the Department had produced substantial evidence to prove its charge. (Initial Decision at p. 12)
20

Indeed, in footnote 17 of their Decision and Order of Remand, the Board expresses its concern that the
Department would attempt to support any allegations surrounding the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident on a verbal
order given nearly three months after the facts giving rise to that allegation.
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and vacated her decision. After careful reconsideration and review ofthe Board's initial finding with
respect to this allegation, the Board believes there is no legal justification to overturn its prior
decision.
DECISION
The Board has addressed each of the issues raised by the Department in their appeal. After
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision with
respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident
The Board further finds that the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to the August 19,1999 Farm
Field Tractor Incident is supported by substantial evidence and is sustained. Though not properly
on appeal before the Board, the Board considered and reviewed its decision with respect to the High
Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. After careful consideration, the
Board finds no legal justification to overturn its prior decision with respect to these incidents.

DATED this 28th day of January 2003.

DECISION UNANIMOUS
Blake S. Atkin, Chair
Joan M. Gallegos, Member
Gloria E. Wheeler, Member
Dale L. Whittle, Member

Blake S. Atkin
Chair, Career Service Review Board

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication andfinalagency action pursuant to
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act
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